Mi uzos la lingvo esperanta por
La idiomo oficiala de F.O.G.
- 'FrontoOmbraGvatsekvi' -
au "ShadowFront" en angla!
--W.S.Duncan-Binns, Chief ShadowObjectivist

I am Mark Rosst, an innovator in the field of Social Network
Optimization. Structural Deep Democracy(SD2), which I have
developed, is a non-ideological approach to organizing collective
action and is a maximally leveraged approach to solving world
problems. SD2 uses PageRank as a centrality algorithm to analyze
votes to determine the center of TRUST and CONSENT in a human trust
network. The top three or five lead such an organization with one of
them as the executive. This creates a small and efficient locus of
trust and accountability to lead the organization.

PageRank allows the best leaders to determine who the best leaders
are, eliminating the popularity game of conventional populistic-
democracy. SD2 can be used by nonprofits, businesses, government
entities, but it is intended to be best for grass-roots activism for
groups thirty or more, and is scalable to a global level.

SD2's assumptions are:

1. Solving world problems requires collective action

2. Collective action is best organized democraticly

3. Democracy is based on voting

4. Votes are processed with *centrality algorithms*

5. The best way to find expert opinion is to "ask around"

6. The *centrality algorithm* that "asks around" is PageRank

7. Therefore PageRank probably is the best algorithm to process
voting ballots

8. SD2 uses PageRank to select three or five leaders of the group,
then keeps those leaders accountable with frequent rank
recalculations

PageRank: rank = (# of in-votes) X (avg. strength of in-vote), AND
strength of out-vote = rank / (# of out-votes)

"The results are amazingly accurate and display the inner dynamics
of the group with astonishing accuracy...Nawab is next in seniority
and first as a Technician. He definitely deserves centrality."
- Sirdar Timur Hyat-Khan, Leader in Sustainable Development and
Chairman, Khidmat Foundation, commenting about an SD2 pilot study
with Contact Youth

Please join: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/shadowobjectivists

shanti
Mark, Seattle

So are you Mark Rosst or W.S. Duncan-Binns? Your post appears to be signed under both names. And how is the proposed voting method better than the ones proposed by mathematicians, e.g. BeatpathWinner, the various Condorcet variations, etc? And what has any of this to do with Esperanto anyway?

Re: Troy JONES

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>W: So are you Mark Rosst or parashakti108? Your post appears to be signed
under both names.
 
-M: I am both.
 
>W: And how is the proposed voting method better than the ones proposed by mathematicians, e.g. BeatpathWinner, the various Condorcet variations, etc?
 
-M: These algorithms are based on merely counting votes. My system follows voting chains - A votes for b, who votes for c, who votes for d...ad infinitum
 
>W: And what has any of this to do with world peace anyway?
 
The idea is that people usually vote for those more qualified than themselves - so my algorithm takes this idea as far as possible - to a convergence of qualification.
 
If we select the absolute BEST people - this will lead to unity - how else better than this?
 
shanti
Mark, Seattle

What are "M" and "W"? Some sort of Ayn Rand slang?

>> W: So are you Mark Rosst or parashakti108? Your post appears to be signed under both names.  
> -M: I am both.

And you are W.S. Duncan-Binns as well? Are you also the "Nawab" who "deserves centrality"? And BTW, what was the point, in quoting me, to change "W.S. Duncan-Binns" to "parashakti108"? Who's that?

Kaj ĉu vi ankaŭ estas W.S. Duncan-Binns? Ĉu vi ankaŭ estas tiu "Nawab" kiu "meritas mezecon"? Kaj paranteze, kio estis la utilo, en via cito de mi, ŝanĝi "W.S. Duncan-Binns" al "parashakti108"? Kiu estas tiu?

> -M: These algorithms are based on merely counting votes. My system follows voting chains - A votes for b, who votes for c, who votes for d...ad infinitum

Actually, no. "These algorithms" are voting methods whereby voters rank candidates according to preference, and the winner is selected by mathematically analyzing the "pairwise comparisons" so generated. That is, in a vote with candidates A, B, C, and D, the pairwise contests would be A vs B, A vs C, A vs D, B vs C, B vs D, and C vs D, and the winner of each pairwise contest would be the one who got more votes ranking him higher than his pairwise opponent (e.g. if 12 people rated A higher than C, but 19 rated C higher than A, then C is the winner of the A vs C comparison, with a "strength" of 19). Where the methods differ is in how to handle cases where for example A beats B, B beats C, C beats D, and D beats A. One relatively simple method is to start dropping pairwise comparisons, weakest (i.e. lowest strength-score) first, next-weakest next, etc, until there is a candidate with no pairwise defeats remaining.

I don't know what you mean by "voting chains - A votes for b, who votes for c, who votes for d". Why wouldn't A vote for A, B for B, etc? And what difference would it make even if someone couldn't vote for themselves?

Ne, efektive. "Tiuj algoritmoj" estas balotmetodoj, laŭ kiu balotantoj rangigi kandidatojn laŭprefere, kaj la venkanta kandidato estas elektita de matematika analizo de la "duopaj komparoj" tiel kreitaj. Alivorte, je balotkonkurso kun la kandidatoj A, B, C, kaj D, la duopaj komparoj estus A kontraŭ B, A kontraŭ C, A kontraŭ D, B kontraŭ C, B kontraŭ D, kaj C kontraŭ D. La venkanto de iu komparo estus tiu, kiu ricevis pli balotojn, kiu rangigis tiun pli alte ol ties kontraŭulo. (Ekzemple se 12 balotantoj rangigis A-on pli alte ol C-on, sed 19 rangigis C-on pli alte ol A-on, tial C estas la venanto de la A-kontraŭ-C komparo, kun "forteco" de 19). La metodoj malsamas laŭ la trakto de la kazoj, je kiu ekzemple A venkas B-on, B venkas C-on, C venkas D-on, kaj D venkas A-on. Unu rilate simpla metodo estas komenci forigi duopajn komparojn, la plej malforta (t.e., tiu kun la malplej alta forteco-takso) unue, sekve-plej malforta sekve, kaj tiel plu, ĝis troviĝas kandidato sen duopaj malvenkoj ceteraj.

Mi ne scias, kion vi volas diri per "baloto-ĉenoj -- A balotas B-on, kiu balotas C-on, kiu balotas D-on". Kial A ne balotas sin, B balotas sin, ktp? Kaj kia efektiva diferenco okazus, eĉ se oni ne povus baloti sin?

>> W: And what has any of this to do with world peace anyway?  
>The idea is that people usually vote for those more qualified than themselves - so my algorithm takes this idea as far as possible - to a convergence of qualification.   If we select the absolute BEST people - this will lead to unity - how else better than this?

My question was, what has any of this to do with Esperanto?

At any rate, if mere voting led to "unity" (much less "world peace"), then the elections of Jan. 30 in Iraq would have solved that country's problems instead of worsening them. You could argue, I suppose, that your method would have been "better", but you would be wrong -- the will of the majority of the Iraqi people was to have a pro-Iran, Shiite-dominated government, and no possible democratic voting system could have brought about a substantively different result.

Democracy is good and all, but it's no panacaea, "structurally deep" or otherwise.