T0dd:I don't like rilati because it's far too general. Words have connections to things that they don't refer to, as well as to things that they do refer to.

So, you are saying that words do not always have the meaning to which they are usually connected?

I think the above usage of 'connected' conveys exactly the same meaning as 'refer'.

As soon as a word has a connection to something, then it refers to that thing, so I don't fully understand what you mean by "Words have connections to things that they don't refer to". For that to make sense, you'd have to add 'usually refer to'.

Another possibility: povi signifi ("to be capable of meaning"). That's a bit wider than "signify".

T0dd:For example, the expressions "creature with a heart" and "creature with a kidney" refer to the same set of creatures. The expressions are, as we say, co-extensive. But they do not mean the same thing.

What the heck?!

Is that because one of the creatures has two kidneys? What's philosophical about that?

It's like the deep philosophical difference between the 'pink cow' and the 'murky turquoise cow'. Neither exist, but their hypethetical existence is indeed co-existive.
As is their sister, the one with a missing eyelash.

but of course if you want to write about the concept of reference directly, that kind of thing quickly gets tiresome, not to mention obscure.

Would it be unreasonable to think that philosophical arguments that are language specific - can't be expressed in another language - are not of universal interest.

You have said yourself that in philosophy it is necessary to be define what you are talking about. So what you suggest might be tiresome would be an essential part of philosophical argument.

I'm not sure that my translations of the specific sentences are 'work-arounds'.

Anyway, would not the concept of reference be the relationship between the signo and the signataĵo.

Both the definitions in NPIV2005 under 'aludi' seem to imply a certain indirectness. The first one explicitly says Paroli pri iu aŭ io ne uzante la propran nomon aŭ vorto, sed iel komprenigante pri kiu aŭ kio temas.

So the word train would not allude/aludi to a train because that is the right word for that mode of transport. But the King of Pop could refer to Michael Jackson (or may be Elvis) and an Esperantist could reasonably ask 'al kiu vi aludas' or in English 'who are you referring to'.

The relationship between the thing referred to and the word is much more direct in the notion of 'signado', and as an alternative I think we might refer to indentification/ identigo.

'Montri estante signo' is definition 1. in NPIV for signi.

Obviously, if I say that I see a train coming, I not talking about seeing a word but what that word denotes - la vorto trajno signas la realmondan aferon, staras en la rilato de signo al la afero signata.

NPIV defines signo as io, kio per natura aŭ konvencia rilato elvokas ideon pri alia afero.

Since we are concerned here with the relationship between words and the real world, then the object itself can be 'la alia afero'.

sudanglo:Would it be unreasonable to think that philosophical arguments that are language specific - can't be expressed in another language - are not of universal interest.

I don't know that there are any such arguments. I'm inclined to doubt it. What is undeniable, however, is that concepts that are expressed compactly in one language may require more laborious expression in another. That doesn't make them language-specific, and this certainly isn't peculiar to philosophy. German Gemütlichkeit is a well-known example of a word that doesn't have a simple compact translation in English. But that doesn't make it untranslatable.

The distinction between meaning and reference, although recognized since the medieval period (if not before), was brought back into the spotlight by Gottlob Frege, as Sinn und Bedeutung, but even in German he had to "tweak" the definitions of these words to nail down what he meant.

You have said yourself that in philosophy it is necessary to be define what you are talking about. So what you suggest might be tiresome would be an essential part of philosophical argument.

What's tiresome is to have to resort to other expressions to get at what is expressed simply and directly in English by the word "refer".

Anyway, would not the concept of reference be the relationship between the signo and the signataĵo.

No. Smoke is a sign of fire. Smoke doesn't refer to fire. Signo is a pretty direct cognate of English "sign".

NPIV defines signo as io, kio per natura aŭ konvencia rilato elvokas ideon pri alia afero.

Yes. "Refer" is never natural, always conventional. We want a word that captures only the conventional sense, because it's important to distinguish words from signs in the natural sense.

But I agree that the PIV definition of aludi really does seem to collide with Wells's usage. Drat!

I'm starting to think that a new compound word might be the best way to go. I'm considering priceli for the job, as it combines that aboutness of all referring expressions with the concept of directedness, as erinja suggested. Obviously, the word would have to be defined before use, but I don't think that would be insurmountable.

Priceli (tr)--
Roli kiel konvencia signo aŭ indikilo per kiu oni povas paroli aŭ skribi aŭ pensi pri iu ajn afero.

Do you think it could catch on?

Chainy:

T0dd:For example, the expressions "creature with a heart" and "creature with a kidney" refer to the same set of creatures. The expressions are, as we say, co-extensive. But they do not mean the same thing.

What the heck?!

Is that because one of the creatures has two kidneys? What's philosophical about that?

It's like the deep philosophical difference between the 'pink cow' and the 'murky turquoise cow'. Neither exist, but their hypethetical existence is indeed co-existive.
As is their sister, the one with a missing eyelash.

I thought it meant that while a creature can have both a heart and a kidney, that does not meant that a creature with a heart and a creature with a kidney must necessarily be the same thing, despite the fact that logic might drive us to conclude that because they have the same organs as a creature that has them it doesn't make them the same.... How that relates to the topic I'm not sure because I haven't been reading the topic, I'm too busy being mesmerised by these philosophical bits and pieces haha.

(Although, evolution sort of buggers that theory up a bit, since while we could say that a human and a rat are certainly not the same, they might be more similar than we'd like to think... mwahaha!)

T0dd: the word would have to be defined before use..

That would apply to most alternatives in this thread. If you are going to set up a special meaning, you might as well give it to the simplest altenative available. For example signi (i.e. a conventional rather than a natural sign, e.g. as in semaphore).

Absolutely, Miland.

Although English 'sign' and 'signo' in Esperanto may be cognate, the Esperanto verb 'signi' does appear to have a direct cognate verbal equivalent in English.

And I think we can deal with issue of some signoj not denoting what they are signs of (smoke/fire) by a limiting definition.

It really helps to follow an argument if you don't import obscure terminology, but just define any limitations on how you are using a word.

I was reading a Linguistics article (comment in another thread) which introduce the term 'tele-eco' and then proceded to obfuscate the argument referring to things as 'telea' or not, quite unnecessarily.

Of course, this sort of activity is perfect for hiding the fact that the Emperor has no clothes.

When you need a word for a concept that has no term already available, you have two choices. You can coin a new term and stipulate a definition, or you can stipulate a modified definition of an existing word. Both options have their advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of coining a new term is precisely that it doesn't have pre-existing meanings that might tend to mislead people. The disadvantage, of course, is that it's a new word, and so it has to be defined each time it's used, until it catches on.

When you stipulate a new definition for an existing word, the disadvantage is still there. You must remind people of the special definition each time you use it, until it catches on. The advantage is that it's not a new word, so it at least seems familiar.

When physicists decided to use the word "spin" to describe a property of electrons, they knew that they'd be inviting some confusion in the lay public, but they didn't really care about that. It just doesn't matter to physicists whether non-physicists think that electrons literally spin.

Specialized terminology exists because specialized discourse requires it. To be sure, there are excesses, in every field. But as a general thing, the demands of specialized discourse are different from the demands of everyday conversation, and as a result of that the language used is put under a special kind of stress.

In this case the concept of reference is a fundamental concept. It is needed constantly in any kind of analytical discussion about language, whether it's in linguistics or philosophy. Reference is as fundamental to the study of language as mass or inertia is to physics. It happens that English has a single verb to express it: to refer; but Esperanto doesn't. The concept is still fundamental.

The reason why I like the coined term priceli is that it combines the Intentionality of pri with the directionality of celi. Intentionality and reference are closely connected concepts. Intentional objects (pictures, texts) refer to what they are about. They do so because the words or pictorial symbols that form them refer to things.

So, for any kind of serious analytical discussion of language, be it philosophical or linguistic (they are by no means the same), you need to be able to talk about reference in a way that is clearly distinct from the more general "signing" or signification.

For Intentionality, prieco is exactly the right word. It nails it. For reference, there's no Esperanto root that nails it. Although stipulating a restricted usage of signi is a reasonable option, it does court confusion, for precisely the same reason that "Intentionality" itself is confusing to anglophones. It looks familiar, but it really is something different.

Given the the very wide semantic scope of 'refer' in English (see any good English -French dictionary for just how many meanings this English word has), I'd say that there is more of a problem stemming from using it in a narrow technical sense than there might be for narrowly using the word 'signi' in Esperanto.

By the way, if referring is such a basic concept in linguistics and philosophy, then it must crop up in French texts, and I wonder how they handle it.

It might be possible to borrow their solution for Esperanto.